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1 
GOOD FAITH – THE GORDIAN KNOT 
OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE 
Bruno Zeller & Camilla Baasch Andersen* 
INTRODUCTION 
Good faith has long been one of “those” issues in an inter-
national context: one of the issues which represent a perplexing 
legal bee-hive of near unanswerable questions. The concept is 
perceived as the desperate argument of the loosing lawyer in 
one jurisdiction, and the firmament of an established principle 
of fairness in another. Even within one jurisdiction it can rep-
resent a hotbed of uncertainty and unpredictability, and when 
applied across borders in international commerce, this problem 
is compounded. 
Across the legal jurisdictions of the world, the term (or its 
multi-linguistic equivalences) has been debated at length and 
has either been included into domestic laws, or has been simply 
rejected as being too nebulous or not being able to be defined. It 
found its way into a host of civil law jurisdictions in different 
guises, and into the Uniform Commercial Code of the United 
States, but has only found a very unstable foot hold in English 
Common law, via European supranational legislation. In Aus-
tralia good faith is an implied term and hence—unless specifi-
cally excluded—is applicable in all contractual relationships 
within the State legal systems, with no clarity on what this 
means.1 
                                                          
* Dr. Bruno Zeller is a Professor of Transnational Law at the University of 
Western Australia, Adjunct Professor, School of Law, Murdoch University – 
Perth, Fellow of the Australian Institute for Commercial Arbitration, Panel of 
Arbitrators – MLAANZ, Visiting Professor Stetson Law School, Florida and 
Humboldt University Berlin; Dr. Camilla Baasch Andersen is Professor of In-
ternational Commercial Law at the University of Western Australia, Fellow 
of the International Commercial Law Institute at University of Pace (New 
York)  
1 Unfortunately, the Australian High Court has not yet delivered an au-
thoritative statement on the topic of good faith. 
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In short, there is no international consensus as to what the 
term embodies, or how it may be used to decide a case, in dif-
ferent legal jurisdictions. 
However, the term also applies throughout a number of in-
ternational instruments in commerce, such as the 1980 Con-
vention of the International Sale of Goods (CISG) which is cur-
rently the applicable sales law for 83 states, including the USA 
and Australia, China and most major industrial nations (to-
gether representing over 75% of the world’s trade). The impact 
of the CISG is seen even beyond its contracting states, and it is 
finding its way into the Courts of the UK, as an expression of 
international trade practices.2  Its influence is significant, and 
growing.3 Even countries which are not parties to the CISG are 
using its provisions as expressions of international trade prac-
tice.4 
Article 7 of the CISG requires its provisions to be inter-
preted in the light of the need to regard good faith. The very 
same provision also requires regard to the “uniformity” of the 
convention as well as its “international character.” It thus pre-
supposes a uniform and international approach to good faith: 
Something which is, undeniably, an intractable problem, a true 
Gordian knot. 
This paper does not attempt to cut this knot as Alexander 
the Great did with his legendary problem. Rather, it raises a 
number of questions which are due to some considerable dis-
cussion at an international level, involving the scope of the con-
cept, and how to determine its meaning. 
One of these issues for consideration is whether good faith 
has only one meaning or whether it is capable of being applied 
in various disguises depending whether it is used in a domestic 
                                                          
2 Institute of International Commercial Law, CISG Database: Country 
Case Schedule – UK (Apr. 14, 2015), 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/casecit.html#UK. 
3 Francesco Mazzotta, Good Faith Principle: Vexata Quaestio, in 
INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW, A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 120 (Larry A. DiMatteo 
ed., 2014). 
4 For instance, there are three reported cases from the UK applying the 
CISG as trade practice indicator, see ProForce Recruit Ltd. v. Rugby Group 
Ltd. [2006] EWCA Civ. 69 (appeal taken from Eng.); The Square Mile Part-
nership Ltd. v. Fitzmaurice McCall Ltd. [2006] EWCA Civ. 1689 (appeal tak-
en from Eng.); Chartbrook Ltd. v. Persimmon Homes Ltd. et. al. [2009] UKHL 
38, [2009] 3 WLR 267 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
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setting or in an international one through the CISG.  If that 
would be case potentially two different definitions of good faith 
would need to be applied. Andersen argued in a recent paper 
that good faith “is simply too tainted by regional diversity to be 
of any constructive use on a global transnational playing 
field.”5  But many would balk at abandoning a concept which 
has served in one guise or another for more than 2000 years. 
Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that good faith is 
part of the remedial system in cases of breaches of contractual 
terms. This is so as the law only recognises a wrong if it has al-
ready recognised a pre-existing duty.6 The pre-existing duty is 
based on performance of contractual duties in good faith and “it 
is the ideal vehicle through which to introduce and incorporate 
the goals of ‘expansive equality’ into contract law.”7  The rela-
tionship between good faith and approaches to contractual in-
terpretation thus becomes significant. 
In this context, Sepe argues that parties have an informa-
tional advantage over courts and hence know best when good 
faith serves efficiently. 
What Sepe suggests is that parties only derive the desired 
ex-ante value of their relationship when the correct interpreta-
tive regime incorporating good faith is applied. That might be 
true but what good faith means or how it is applied has been 
left undefined.8 
This paper argues that good faith cannot be defined and 
furthermore that there is no need to define good faith as it 
takes on meaning when applied to facts. Hence an explanation 
or application of good faith is defined by its function namely to 
enforce the expected performance of both parties. It is further 
argued that the function of good faith will determine which fact 
pattern has to be found by a court in order to determine the ex-
                                                          
5 Camilla Andersen, Good Faith? Good Grief? Festschrift for Bruno 
Zeller, 17 INT’L TRADE AND BUS. L. REV. 310, 311 (2014). 
6 Justice James Edelman, The Benefit of Legal Taxonomy, 1 CURTIN L. 
AND TAX. REV. 1, 5-6 (2014). 
7 Emily Houh, Critical Interventions: Towards an Expansive Equality 
Approach to the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 
1025, 1033 (2002-2003) [hereinafter Houh, Critical Interventions]. 
8 Simone M. Sepe, Good Faith and Contract Interpretation: A Law and 
Economics Perspective (Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 10-28, 
2010) 1, 6 [hereinafter Sepe, Good Faith and Contract]. 
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pected performance of the contractual parties.  It follows that 
good faith is the legal concept which allows courts to do justice 
and do it according to law. As good faith takes on meaning only 
when applied to contractual terms, Peden is correct to argue 
that “. . . the widespread use of ‘good faith’ in legislation is . . . 
completely unhelpful in the development of contractual good 
faith.”9 
An interesting way to juxtaposition this point transnation-
ally is to look at international and US theories of good faith in 
the light of the development of good faith in a jurisdiction 
which has struck a civil law/common law compromise about the 
use of the concept. Australia presents itself as a fledgling na-
tion in the development of good faith, while simultaneously be-
ing a CISG state subject to the good faith of Art. 7. The paper 
will therefore examine the following: 
The theoretical base on which a definition or explanation of 
the function of good faith is based is very divergent and will be 
discussed in part one. The conclusion which can be drawn from 
part one will be applied in part two to the most important 
available judicial decisions in determining whether there is 
consistency in the application of the concept. Part three will 
discuss whether the CISG and the domestic interpretative 
methods will influence the applications of good faith. 
THE THEORETICAL BASE 
It is not surprising that a definition of good faith proved to be 
frustratingly elusive despite that the concept of good faith ap-
pears to be easy to grasp as many terms in essence convey at 
least a similar duty. This is highlighted by the fact that a 
search reveals that the term good faith has been equated to: 
“unconscionability, fairness, fair conduct, reasonable standards 
of fair dealing, decency, reasonableness, decent behaviour, a 
common ethical sense, a spirit of solidarity, community stand-
ards of fairness” and “honesty in fact,”10 the question is wheth-
                                                          
9 Elisabeth Peden, The Mistake of Looking for Legislative Influence in 
Contractual Good Faith, 16(4) COMM. L.Q. 20 (2002). 
10 Troy Keily, Good Faith and the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (CISG), 3(1) VINDOBONA J. INT’L. COM. L. & ARB. 
15 (1999). 
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er each of the terms describes the same phenomena namely 
good faith. This paper will not pursue this issue. 
Furthermore, the examination has not only turned on what 
good faith means, but also what it covers. As an example, the 
UCC in article 1-203 states that good faith is required in both 
the performance and the enforcement of contracts. Professor 
Farnsworth also noted that the UCC uses the term good faith 
in two fundamentally different senses first as good faith pur-
chase and secondly as performance and enforcement mecha-
nism.11  The scholarly or judicial interest in good faith general-
ly has either focused on good faith performance or has assumed 
that the meaning of good faith in the performance, enforcement 
and good faith purchase must be the identical.12 Andersen ar-
gued that this is not the case and that good faith warrants sep-
arate examination and development.13 Andersen described the 
difference between performance and enforcement as follows: 
Performance describes the benefits the receiving party primarily 
has bargained to receive from the other. The performance of a 
contract is what, at the time of contract formation the parties 
contemplated would satisfy the receiving party’s purpose in en-
tering the agreement. Performance is thus distinguished form en-
forcement, which consists of the means available to compensate 
for the unjustified absence of performance or to provide other in-
centives making performance more likely to occur.14 
This paper recognises this fact.  As a consequence this pa-
per purposefully will focus the discussion only on good faith 
performance. 
The starting point is to recognise that the implied terms of 
co-operation are not controversial even in English law. In Mac-
kay v. Dick,15 Lord Blackburn stated: 
as a general rule . . . where in a written contract it appears that 
both parties have agreed that something shall be done, which 
                                                          
11 Alan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasona-
bleness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U.CHI. L. REV. 666, 667-68 
(1963). 
12 Eric Andersen, Good Faith in the Enforcement of Contracts, 73 IOWA 
L. REV. 299, 299 (1987-1988) [hereinafter Andersen, Enforcement of Con-
tracts].  
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 303-04. 
15 Mackay v. Dick [1881] 6 App. Cas. 251 (appeal taken from Eng.).  
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cannot effectually be done unless both concur in doing it, the con-
struction of the contract is that each agrees to do all that is nec-
essary to be done on his part for the carrying out of that thing, 
though there may be no express words to that effect.16 
It is therefore not a great leap from the obligation to co-
operate to include a term of good faith into a contract. In es-
sence both terms attempt to achieve the same outcome namely 
to determine the required performance of both parties under a 
contract. As noted above already a discussion whether the term 
to co-operate or the term good faith are identical is not within 
the scope of this paper. 
As far as good faith is concerned the seminal work under-
taken by Professors Summers17 and Burton18 warrants close at-
tention. Especially Summers is of importance as his theory was 
the basis in explaining the application of good faith in article 
205 in the second Restatement of Contract which appeared in 
1979 (and finally published in 1981).19  Summers theory basi-
cally relies on the excluder principle. He explains that the ex-
pression “good faith” as commonly (and sometimes vaguely) 
used by judges is best understood as an “excluder”; that is, it 
“has no general meaning or meanings of its own, but . . . serves 
to exclude many heterogeneous forms of bad faith.”20 Sepe 
summarised Summers’ arguments in favour of an open-ended 
conceptualisation of good faith in order to guarantee the sub-
stantive justice of contractual relations. Good faith imposes on 
                                                          
16 Mackay, 6 App. Cas. at 263. 
17 See Robert Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith – Its Recogni-
tion and Conceptualisation, 67(4) CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982) [hereinafter 
Summers, General Duty of Good Faith]; Robert Summers, “Good Faith” in 
General Contract Law and the Sales Provision of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968) [hereinafter Summers, “Good Faith” in Gen-
eral Contract Law]. 
18 See Steven Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to 
Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369 (1980) [hereinafter Burton, 
Breach of Contract]; Steven Burton, Good Faith Performance of a Contract 
Within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Law Code, 67 IOWA L. REV. 1 
(1981) [hereinafter Burton, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Law Code]; 
Steven Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply to 
Professor Summers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 497 (1984) [hereinafter Burton, More on 
Good Faith Performance]. 
19 Summers, General Duty of Good Faith, supra note 17, at 810. 
20 Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law, supra note 17, at 
196, 262. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/1
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parties separate moral standards of conduct, which may over-
ride the explicit terns of the contract if these do not satisfy re-
quirements of decency, fairness, or reasonableness.21 
Summers argued that the conceptualisation of good faith 
as an excluder satisfies the relevant criteria of adequacy.22 He 
also maintained that the excluder analysis has been first artic-
ulated by philosophers such as Aristotle and J.L. Austin.23 
Summers already realised that good faith has no meaning of its 
own.  It is true to say that once all bad faith behaviour is ex-
cluded we are left with what could be termed good faith behav-
iour or any other term for that matter. However, the crucial 
point is what is bad faith? If something is to be excluded we 
need to know what it actually is. Summers left the question of 
how bad faith is discovered unanswered. The closest he came to 
define bad faith is to argue that it is the exclusion of contextu-
ally recognisable forms conducted in the performance of a given 
contract.24 
A further problem with the analysis is that Summers in-
cludes concepts of morality, decency fairness, or reasonableness 
as being connected or part of good faith. The issue is that all 
the terms are in Summers implied view a reflection of good 
faith.  As good faith is a fall-back position whether is synony-
mous with morality, decency or reasonableness is irrelevant. 
The central concern in Summers theory is that bad faith needs 
to be recognised and excluded. 
Burton also rejected the excluder principle and by implica-
tion the comment in the Restatement (Second). Burton observed 
that “[c]ourts generally do not use the good faith performance 
doctrine to override the agreement of the parties. Rather, the 
good faith performance doctrine is used to effectuate the inten-
tions of the parties, to protect their reasonable expectations 
though interpretation and implication.”25 
By implication, Burton recognised that if parties either ex-
clude good faith or the intentions of the parties as expressed in 
the contract are clear good faith is not to be applied. This is so 
                                                          
21 Sepe, Good Faith and Contract, supra note 8, at 14. 
22 Summers, General Duty of Good Faith, supra note 17, at 821. 
23 Id. at 827.  
24 Houh, Critical Interventions, supra note 7, at 1036. 
25 Burton, More on Good Faith Performance, supra note 18, at 499. 
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as performance of the parties is contextually determinable. 
Good faith in essence is only required when the intentions and 
the performance are at odds with each other. Burton’s attempt 
was to justify a forgone opportunity approach by suggesting 
that it will make it possible “to identify with greater particular-
ity the relevant expectations and motives that have been held 
to constitute bad faith.”26 Burton notes that “[g]ood faith per-
formance occurs when a party’s discretion is exercised for any 
purpose within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at 
the time of formation – to capture opportunities that were pre-
served upon entering the contract, interpreted objectively.”27 
Summers maintains that “such formulation provides very 
little, if any, genuine definitional guidance.”28 This criticism is 
not valid as Summers had argued that a definition of good faith 
is impossible and Burton never attempted to define good faith 
at all. By noting “good faith performance occurs” suggests that 
a path or a general tool is describing the capture of opportuni-
ties which are in the reasonable contemplation of the parties. 
In other words Burton attempts to maintain the equilibrium of 
contract expectations as they existed at the formation of the 
contract. Burton though distinguishes legitimate from illegiti-
mate use of discretion and the good faith performance permits 
parties to exercise their discretion “for any purpose reasonably 
within the contemplation of the parties.”29 
Andersen, building on Burton’s theory, suggests that good 
faith is the principle that controls the discretion a party enjoys 
in determining what constitutes proper performance30 and that 
“the views of Professors Burton and Farnsworth coalescence to 
establish a concept of good faith in performance that, in effect, 
defines a category of permitted performance.”31  Andersen fur-
ther noted: 
Professor Farnsworth has argued that good faith in performance 
is linked to the implied terms that courts supply to fill gaps par-
ties leave in agreements. He explains that such a gap – or casus 
                                                          
26 Burton, Breach of Contract, supra note 18, at 387. 
27 Id. at 373.   
28 Summers, General Duty of Good Faith, supra note 17, at 829. 
29 Burton, Breach of Contract, supra note 18, at 385-87.  
30 Andersen, Enforcement of Contracts, supra note 12, at 325. 
31 Id. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/1
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omissus – may result either from the parties failure to foresee a 
set of circumstances that has arisen or from their decision not to 
address with express terms a particular set of circumstances that 
was foreseen.32 
What can be said is that Professors Summers Burton and 
Farnsworth have highlighted the problems in discovering a 
possible application of good faith through its application. There 
is one point in the debate where especially Summers and Bur-
ton agree on namely that there is no general definition of good 
faith. However, there is also disagreement. Summers excluder 
principle was criticised because what bad faith actually is has 
not been defined. In other words what exactly are we to exclude 
has not been answered. Summers justifies this approach by ar-
guing that good faith has no general meaning of its own there-
fore the meaning must be derived from an opposite that is bad 
faith.33  There is authority which specifically rejects the “amor-
phous concept” of bad faith to determine whether good faith 
has been breached. The grounds on which the opinions are 
based are the difficulty to distinguish; 
a bad faith discharge from no-cause discharge (which is permit-
ted under the at-will doctrine) or a discharge in violation of pub-
lic policy (which is not permitted) and on the further ground that 
a bad faith standard would require a judicial inquiry into the 
subjective intentions of the party who is alleged to have violated 
the covenant.34 
Burton’s arguments, however, have also been criticised 
specifically; how do we find or understand what discretion in 
performance means? This is an important question as Professor 
Summers observed that Burton “seems content, for example to 
leave the general test of reasonableness of expectations rela-
tively unanalysed”35 
This criticism is very simply dismissed as a non-issue by 
looking at the claim of the aggrieved party which will set out 
                                                          
32 Andersen, Enforcement of Contracts, supra note 12, at 325. 
33 Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law, supra note 17, at 
201. 
34 82 Am. Jur. 2d Wrongful Discharge § 69, quoting Metcalf v. Inter-
mountain Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744 (1989) and Sorensen v. Comm Tek, Inc., 299 
P.2d 70 (1990). 
35 Summers, General Duty of Good Faith, supra note 17, at 833. 
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what expectations are not met. The court only needs to deter-
mine whether the clause in question is either clear that is there 
is no discretion allowable such as a set price for the goods or a 
clause requiring a subjective judgement on a party such “the 
goods must conform to an acceptable standard’.”  Simply put 
the issue is reduced to a fact finding mission namely has the 
party in breach acted within the reasonable expectations of the 
parties if yes there is no breach of good faith. If the answer is 
no there is a breach hence the principle of good faith allows the 
court to act within the law and determine that a breach of an 
express term has occurred. 
In sum this paper argues that both Burton and Summers 
have advanced our understanding of good faith in common law. 
Both correctly observed that good faith should and cannot be 
defined hence arguably the concentration ought to be on when 
and how good faith should be applied. To that end Burton’s 
theory of capturing the opportunities that were expected upon 
entering the contract is practical and deserves to be explored in 
the Australian context. 
GOOD FAITH IN AUSTRALIA 
It is undisputed that in Australia an implied duty to exer-
cise good faith is well established at least within the state court 
systems despite the reluctance of the High court to speak on 
the matter. An attempt or discussion did take place in Royal 
Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v. South Sydney City 
Council36 but the question as to a recognition of good faith was 
left open. The court noted: 
The second matter concerns the debate in various Australian au-
thorities concerning the existence and content of an implied obli-
gation or duty of good faith and fair dealing in contractual per-
formance and the exercise of contractual rights and powers. It 
emerged in argument in this court that both sides accepted the 
existence of such an obligation False  whilst the issues respecting 
the existence and scope of a “good faith” doctrine are important, 
this is an inappropriate occasion to consider them.37 
                                                          
36 Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v. South Sydney City Coun-
cil [2002] 186 ALR 289 (Austl.). 
37 Id. at 301, ¶ 40. 
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Callinan J went even further by stating: 
In view of the conclusion I have reached, it is unnecessary to an-
swer the questions raised by the rather far-reaching contentions 
of the appellant, and for which, it says, Alcatel Australia Ltd. v. 
Scarcella and Burger King Corp v. Hungry Jack’s Pty. Ltd. stand 
as authorities: whether both in performing obligations and exer-
cising rights under a contract, all parties owe to one another a 
duty of good faith; and, the extent to which, if such were to be the 
law, a duty of good faith might deny a party an opportunistic or 
commercial exercise of an otherwise lawful commercial right.38 
Callinan J in effect repeated the English view as to the 
principle of good faith despite the fact that the then Finn J who 
was on the working party for the preparation for the 
UNIDROIT Principles 2004 (and later on the 2010 edition) ad-
vocated the international position. Surprisingly Kirby J. took 
the same view. He commented that despite having the courts 
attention drawn to law both in this country and overseas as 
well as to academic commentary: 
in Australia, such an implied term appears to conﬂict with fun-
damental notions of caveat emptor that are inherent (statute and 
equitable intervention apart) in common law conceptions of eco-
nomic freedom. It also appears to be inconsistent with the law as 
it has developed in this country in respect of the introduction of 
implied terms into written contracts which the parties have omit-
ted to include.39 
As Callinan J so did Kirby J view the principle of good 
faith as being inconsistent with the concept of economic free-
dom. However, in Farah Constructions Pty. Ltd. v. Say-Dee Pty. 
Ltd40  the court indirectly ruled that an implied duty of good 
faith does exist. The court noted: 
Intermediate appellate courts and trial judges in Australia 
should not depart from decisions in intermediate appellate courts 
in another jurisdiction on the interpretation of Commonwealth 
legislation or uniform national legislation unless they are con-
vinced that the interpretation is plainly wrong. Since there is a 
common law of Australia rather than of each Australian jurisdic-
                                                          
38 Id. at 327, ¶ 156.  
39 Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Tr., 186 ALR at 312, ¶ 87-88. 
40 Farah Constructions. Pty. Ltd. v. Say-Dee Pty. Ltd. [2007] 230 CLR 89 
(Austl.).  
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tion, the same principle applies in relation to non-statutory law.41 
The High Court might have left the door slightly ajar but 
not sufficiently in order to admit good faith. Academic views 
are mixed42 and reservations are also expressed such as Peden 
who argued: 
[G]ood faith in the performance of contracts is one of those an-
noying areas of law that keeps appearing in cases, and yet even 
with decisions from appeal courts, we seem no closer to a resolu-
tion of exactly when an obligation of good faith in the perfor-
mance of contracts will be incorporated, and exactly what that 
obligation will impose.43 
Peden did pose the questions which arguably have been 
addressed by Summers, Burton and Farnsworth. Their views 
appear to emanate from well-established legal principles iden-
tified in fragments of Burton’s theory, and other scholarly 
judgments and views. As an example, the identification of types 
of contracts in Tote Tasmania Pty. Ltd. v. Garrott44  contains 
elements of Burton’s theory. The court noted: 
One is a provision conferring a power in an agreement, such as a 
partnership agreement, which is concerned with co-operation be-
tween the parties to produce a result which benefits all the par-
ties to the contract. In such an agreement, a court might readily 
imply an obligation to act in good faith in that the party upon 
whom the power is conferred must have regard to the interest of 
all the parties to the agreement. Another type of provision is one 
which confers a power if the donee of the power considers that a 
certain state of affairs or conditions exists. In such a case, a court 
may well hold that the power can only be exercised by an honest 
decision that the state of affairs or condition does exist, but the 
honest exercise of the power will not be reviewed by the court. 
Another type of provision is one conferring a power that is quite 
unqualified. In such a case, a court may conclude that the power 
can legitimately be exercised in the interests of the party upon 
whom it is conferred and that party is to be the sole judge of 
                                                          
41 Id. at 135. 
42 See Bruno Zeller, Good Faith: Is it a Contractual Obligation?, 15(2) 
BOND L. REV. 217 (2003) (providing a positive view with respect to its consid-
eration of international law). 
43 Elisabeth Peden, Good Faith in the Performance of Contract Law, 
42(9) LAW SOC’Y J. 64, 64 (2004). 
44 Tote Tasmania Pty. Ltd. v. Garrott [2008] 17 Tas R 320 (Austl.). 
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where its interests lie and may exercise [sic] the power for any 
reason it sees fit.45 
Burton in essence – as noted above – indicated the same 
principle when he stated: 
“Courts generally do not use the good faith performance 
doctrine to override the agreement of the parties. Rather, the 
good faith performance doctrine is used to effectuate the inten-
tions of the parties, to protect their reasonable expectations 
though interpretation and implication.”46The question as to the 
utility of good faith is whether it delivers certainty in business 
dealings. The Honourable Marilyn Warren made the following 
suggestion, arguably agreeing with Burton’s views: 
. . .[I]t must be acknowledged that good faith as a doctrine does 
not exist independently of the rules surrounding the construction 
and interpretation of contracts, or the rules of implication. Whilst 
the process of contractual interpretation is distinct from the pro-
cess of implying terms into a contract, it can sometimes be diffi-
cult to separate the two. This is particularly so with regard to 
good faith, which appears to be obscured by what may be a merg-
ing of the two processes (interpretation and implication) in the 
arena of good faith.47 
The importance of applying good faith is to recognise that 
it is a principle which derives its authority only in circum-
stances where the interpretation and construction of contracts 
leads the courts to find that a party did not act within the rea-
sonable expectations of the parties. Only after the interpreta-
tive process is finished, can good faith be applied. Farnworth 
argued (as noted above) that good faith in performance is 
linked to the implied terms that courts supply to fill gaps the 
parties have left in the agreements. “A term will be implied in 
law in circumstances where the implication of a particular 
term (usually an obligation) is necessary to prevent the enjoy-
ment of the rights conferred by the contract from being ‘ren-
dered nugatory, worthless or, perhaps, [being] seriously un-
dermined.’”48 
                                                          
45 Id. at 322. 
46 Burton, More on Good Faith Performance, supra note 18, at 499. 
47 The Hon. Marilyn Warren AC, Good Faith: Where Are We At?, 34 
MELB. U. L. REV. 344, 349 (2010). 
48 Id. at 351, citing Byrne v. Australian Airlines Ltd. [1995] 185 CLR 
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The boundary between interpretation and implication is 
not always clear and “it may be that interpretation, to some 
degree, shades into implication.”49 The point was made that af-
ter all “that ‘[i]f good faith is not readily capable of definition 
then [contractual] certainty is undermined’, and that the duty 
to act reasonably may properly be subsumed within the duty of 
good faith.”50“ 
It is submitted that Burton’s theory—and Summers’ for 
that matter—has been greatly undervalued and an examina-
tion of the facts and comments of Australian jurisprudence re-
quires a closer examination. 
The beginning of the debate can be traced back to 1992 in 
Renard Constructions (ME) Pty. Ltd. v. Minister for Public 
Works.51 The court and in particular Priestley, JA noted: 
The kind of reasonableness I have been discussing seems to me to 
have much in common with the notions of good faith which are 
regarded in many of the civil law systems of Europe and in all 
States in the United States as necessarily implied in many kinds 
of contract. Although this implication has not yet been accepted 
to the same extent in Australia as part of judge-made Australian 
contract law, there are many indications that the time may be 
fast approaching when the idea, long recognised as implicit in 
many of the orthodox techniques of solving contractual disputes, 
will gain explicit recognition in the same way as it has in Europe 
and in the United States.52 
However, Summers’ views did resonate in Australia and 
Priestly, J, in Renard Constructions, did think that Summers’ 
approach has the great merit of being workable, without in-
volving the use of fictions often resorted to by courts where the 
good faith obligation is not available, and reflects what actually 
happens in decision making. I think Summers was quite accu-
rate when he said “. . . [T]he typical judge who uses this phrase 
                                                          
410, 450 (McHugh and Gummow JJ) (Austl.), citing Glanville Williams, Lan-
guage and the Law — IV, 61 L. Q. REV. 384, 401 (1945). 
49 Warren, Good Faith: Where Are We At?, supra note 47, 34 MELB. U. L. 
REV. at 355. 
50 Id. at 355-56, quoting Esso Austl. Resources v. S. Pac. Petroleum 
[2005] VSCA 228, [3] (Austl.). 
51 Renard Constructions (ME) Pty. Ltd. v. Minister for Public Works 
[1992]  26 NSWLR 234 (Austl.). 
52 Id. at 263-64.  
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is primarily concerned with ruling out specific conduct, and on-
ly secondarily, or not at all, with formulating the positive con-
tent of a standard.”53 
As discussed above the criticism of Summers’ excluder the-
ory is that he never explained nor defined bad faith. Courts in 
Australia have occupied themselves with this question by ad-
dressing the issue of bad faith. Notably Sheller JA54 quoting 
Kelly J55 stated: 
In most cases, bad faith can be said to occur when one party, 
without reasonable justification, acts in relation to the contracts 
in a manner where the result would be to substantially nullify 
the bargained objective or benefit contracted for by the other, or 
to cause significant harm to the other, contrary to the original 
purpose and expectation of the parties.56 
Sheller JA in effect alludes to the fact that once the origi-
nal purpose and expectations of parties is discovered any devia-
tion can be termed bad faith. Arguably he does not use the ex-
cluder principle as advocated by Summers. Good faith by 
implication demands that parties cannot nullify the bargained 
objectives of the contract. Sir Anthony Mason similarly noted “I 
use good faith mainly in the sense of loyalty to the promise it-
self and as excluding bad faith behaviour”57 Kirby J58 in effect 
stated correctly that good faith behaviour can be determined 
through objective interferences taken from evidence, and that 
good faith means more than the absence of bad faith. Arguably 
Summers’ argument is a back to front analysis as good faith 
becomes the default position by excluding bad faith.  This 
seemingly rejects Summers’ theory by implication as being un-
workable in Australia.  
If one were to accept Burton’s theory, namely situations 
where a party has discretion to perform and would have to be 
interpreted objectively, the crux of the issue is what interpreta-
                                                          
53 Id. at 267. 
54 Alcatel Austl. Ltd. v. Scarcella & Ors. [1998] 44 NSWLR 349 (Austl.). 
55 Gateway Realty Ltd. v. Arton Holdings Ltd. (No 3) [1991] 106 NSR 
(2d) 180 (Austl.). 
56 Id. at 197. 
57 Sir Anthony Mason, Contract, Good Faith and Equitable Standards in 
Fair Dealing, 116 L.Q. REV. 69 (2000). 
58 Canane v. J Canane Pty. Ltd. [1998] 192 CLR 557 (Austl.). 
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tive tool is to be used. 
Two issues really need to occupy the courts namely was 
there a discretion to perform and secondly was that discretion 
used to capture the opportunities which are within the reason-
able contemplation of the parties. It is therefore useful to in-
vestigate whether the leading Australian cases on good faith 
did in essence deal with discretion to perform as argued by 
Burton. 
In Alcatel Australia Ltd. v. Scarsella & Others59 the issue 
was how the terms of the lease were to be constructed. For the 
purpose of this paper it is sufficient to look at clause 2(c)(i) 
which stated: 
That the Lessee will during the said term well and substantially 
repair and keep in good and substantial repair the demised 
premises and all appurtenances thereto belonging and all addi-
tions thereto and the boundary walls and fences thereof and all 
sewers and drains soil and other pipes and sanitary and water 
apparatus.60 
Arguably the terms reflect sufficiently the situation where 
one party has discretion to perform.  Of interest is that the 
court noted: 
Moreover, the common law imposes a duty on the parties to a 
contract to co- operate in achieving the objects of the contract: Sir 
Anthony Mason said that such cases come close to a recognition 
of the good faith doctrine described as “loyalty to the promise it-
self.” But such an obligation cannot over-ride the express provi-
sions of the contract. If a contract confers power on a contracting 
party in terms wider than necessary for the protection of the le-
gitimate interests of that party, the courts may interpret the 
power as not extending to the action proposed by the party in 
whom the power is vested or, alternatively, conclude that the 
powers are being exercised in a capricious or arbitrary manner or 
for an extraneous purpose, which is another way of saying the 
same thing.61 
It can be argued that Alcatel in essence followed Burtons 
theory and applied the implied duty of good faith to a situation 
where good faith needs to be applied. Sheller JA in his judg-
                                                          
59 Alcatel Austl. Ltd, 44 NSWLR at 349. 
60 Id. at 351. 
61 Id. at 368. 
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ment referred not only to Renard Construction but also to the 
relevant sections of the UCC and concluded that  a duty of good 
faith, both in performing obligations and exercising rights may, 
by implication, be imposed upon parties as part of a contract.62 
Finn J in Hughes Aircraft v. Airservices Aust.63 was con-
fronted with the question whether the tender process was con-
ducted in a fair and equitable manner.  Words such as “a pro-
cess that is fair to both Companies” were used which arguably 
inferred that the process was conducted in good faith. In this 
case the discretionary aspect as described by Burton is not ap-
parent. The issue was as the court noted: 
If the purpose of a tender process contract is to be accomplished, 
if contract-tenderers are to be given an effective opportunity to 
enjoy the fruits of their bids, and not to have that opportunity de-
stroyed by the unfair dealing of the other party to the contract, 
the duty to deal fairly is a presupposition of such a contract.64 
Finn J – after noting international sources on good faith – 
concluded that 
It[’]s more open recognition in our own contract law is now war-
ranted . . . I should add that, unlike Gummow I consider a virtue 
of the implied duty to be that it expresses in a generalisation of 
universal application, the standard of conduct to which all con-
tracting parties are to be expected to adhere throughout the lives 
of their contracts.65 
However, Finn J did not define nor indicate what good 
faith actually means and arguably simply relied on Renard 
Construction as having introduced the term of good faith as an 
implied duty into all contracts. 
In Burger King66 the issue turned on cl 4.1.(a) and cl 4.2 
where the granting of  operational, financial and legal approval 
is within “the sole discretion” of Burger King Corporation. If 
full force is given to that concept, it would allow Burger King 
Corporation to give or to withhold relevant approval “at its 
                                                          
62 Id. at 349. 
63 Hughes Aircraft v. Airservs. Austl. [1997] 76 FCR 151 (Austl.). 
64 Id. at 154. 
65 Id. at 192-193. 
66 Burger King Corp. v. Hungry Jack’s Pty. Ltd. [2001] 69 NSWCA 558 
(Austl.). 
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whim.”67 It is clear that the facts fall within the ones promul-
gated by Burton. The court held in point 3 of the judgment: 
Such terms are implied, not to restrict a party to a contract act-
ing so as to promote its own legitimate interests that are con-
sistent with the explicit terms of the agreement, but so that the 
other party’s enjoyment of the rights conferred by the contract 
would not or could not be rendered nugatory, worthless or per-
haps seriously undermined.68 
However, referring to Priestley JA in Renard Construc-
tions the court did in fact mention the excluder theory of Sum-
mers as well to the UCC and the Restatement Second and 
hence accepted the existence of good faith in Australian juris-
prudence.69 Furthermore like in Renard Constructions the 
court noted that Australian cases make no distinction of sub-
stance between the implied term of reasonableness and that of 
good faith. Unsurprisingly the same view was expressed in Al-
catel where Sheller JA was also giving the judgement.70 This 
paper will not pursue the point whether there is in fact a dif-
ference between the two terms but accepts the view as ex-
pressed in Burger King and Alcatel. In relation to the meaning 
of good faith the court followed the principle as expressed in 
Renard Constructions. 
It can be argued that the court - despite the fact relying on 
the excluder theory as expressed by Priestly JA - did in fact fol-
low Burton’s principle without actually noting it expressly. It 
indicates that Burton arguably observed common fact patterns 
and constructed his theory around facts which have been 
linked to reasonableness and of course good faith. 
What can be observed is that Australian jurisprudence is 
consistent in applying good faith but without having settled on 
a sound theoretical base as supplied by Burton. Recently the 
New South Wales Supreme Court had cause to apply good 
faith.71 
At issue was whether the Commonwealth was entitled to evict 
                                                          
67 Id. at 571.  
68 Burger King Corp., 69 NSWCA at 558. 
69 Id. at 566.  
70 Alcatel Austl. Ltd, supra note 54, 44 NSWLR at 369. 
71 NSW Rifle Assn. Inc. v. Commonwealth [2012] ALR 158 (Austl.). 
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the plaintiff from the riﬂe range and associated buildings, and 
whether the Commonwealth could transfer part of the Malabar 
Headland to the state for use as a national park. The Common-
wealth purported to evict the plaintiff relying on its power to 
terminate the contractual license and the doctrine of executive 
necessity.72 
White J following the lead of Finn J in Hughes Aircraft 
Systems International noted: “The fact that the contract is with 
the government does not displace an obligation of good faith 
and reasonableness. If anything, that is a factor in favour of 
the implication of the term.”73  Of importance is that the term 
of good faith is now well established as a matter of law and not 
fact. This is not to say that it cannot be incorporated as a mat-
ter of fact but the difficulties of such an implication far out-
weighs if good faith is implied as a matter of law. White did 
note the difference and referring to jurisprudence that: 
. . . there also appeared to be increasing acceptance of the propo-
sition (which they thought to be correct) that, if terms of good 
faith and reasonableness are to be implied, they are to be implied 
as a matter of law. The preference for implication as a matter of 
law is, no doubt, due to the difficulty of complying with the crite-
ria for an implication in fact enunciated in BP Reﬁnery (Western-
port) Pty. Ltd. v. Hastings Shire Council (1977) 180 CLR 266.74 
Arguably the case turned on the fact whether good faith 
provides the principle basis to remedy the situation where in-
sistence on the prima facie contractual right would be uncon-
scionable. In essence Burton’s thesis again is applicable more 
so than Summers. A clear indication to that end is expressed in 
Macquarie International Health Clinic Pty. Ltd. v. Sydney 
South West Area Health Service75 quoted by White J: 
. . . a contractual obligation of good faith does not require a party 
to act in the interests of the other party or to subordinate its own 
legitimate interest to the interests of the other party; although it 
does require it to have due regard to the legitimate interests of 
                                                          
72 Id. at 158. 
73 NSW Rifle Assn. Inc., [2012] ALR at 180. 
74 Id. at 181. 
75 Macquarie Int’l Health Clinic Pty. Ltd. v. Sydney S.W. Area Health 
Serv. [2010] 15 BPR 28, 563; [2010] NSWCA 268 (Austl.). 
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both parties.76 
Of significance is the view of White J that the” term [of 
good faith] is so obvious as to go without saying”77 and to give 
efficacy to the intended relationship between the parties.78 The 
point is that the relationship and hence the application of good 
faith is not restricted to business dealings or any branch of con-
tract law but in general to all dealing between parties founded 
on a contractual basis. It is in stark contrast to the views ex-
pressed in England. 
It is of interest to note that in BP Reﬁnery (Westernport) 
Pty. Ltd. v. Hastings Shire Council (BP Reﬁnery)79  it was held 
by Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Simon of Glaisdale and Lord Keith 
of Kinkel, Lord Wilberforce and Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest 
dissenting, that: 
In order to justify the implication of a term in a contract which 
the parties have not thought fit to express, the following condi-
tions (which may overlap) must be satisfied: (1) it must be rea-
sonable and equitable; (2) it must be necessary to give business 
efficacy to the contract so that no term will be implied if the con-
tract is effective without it; (3) it must be so obvious that “it goes 
without saying”; (4) it must be capable of clear expression; (5) it 
must not contradict any express terms of the contract.80 
Arguably the above statement is very close if not replicated 
in Burton’s theory as noted above, but repeated here for ease of 
comparison.“Good faith performance occurs when a party’s dis-
cretion is exercised for the purpose within the reasonable con-
templation of the parties at the time of formation – to capture 
opportunities that were preserved upon entering the contract, 
interpreted objectively.”81All the criteria qualifying the implica-
tion as a term of law as expressed in BP Refinery are also con-
tained in Burton’s theory except the words ‘good faith.’  
The treatment of good faith in Australia is in stark con-
                                                          
76 Id. at 147. 
77 Id. at 184. 
78 Id. 
79 BP Reﬁnery (Westernport) Pty. Ltd. v. Hastings Shire Council (1977) 
180 CLR 266 (Austl.). 
80 Id. CLR at 267. 
81 Burton, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Law Code, supra note 18, 
at 373.   
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trast to English law. It appears that as soon as good faith is 
mentioned in English law, instead of focusing on the issues of 
implication of terms focused on good faith. As an example, in 
Walford v. Miles82  good faith was dismissed as being inherent-
ly repugnant to the adversarial position of the parties when in-
volved in negotiations . . . [and] unworkable in practice.83 Im-
portantly Australia has recognised that implications of law are 
to be preferred over an implication of fact. It appears that Eng-
lish law has not reached that point yet. 
In Yam Seng Pty. Ltd. v. International Trade Ltd,84 Leg-
gatt J. addressed the issue of an application of good faith by 
stating first that “refusing, however, if indeed it does refuse, to 
recognise any such general obligation of good faith, this juris-
diction would appear to be swimming against the tide.”85 But 
he went on to explain that: 
I doubt that English law has reached the stage, however, where 
it is ready to recognise a requirement of good faith as a duty im-
plied by law, even as a default rule, into all commercial contracts. 
Nevertheless, there seems to me to be no difficulty, following the 
established methodology of English law for the implication of 
terms in fact, in implying such a duty in any ordinary commer-
cial contract based on the presumed intention of the parties.86 
As Yam  Seng pleaded a breach of an implied term of good 
faith the court had to address the issue. Leggatt J, approached 
the submission by the claimant by noting that he will address a 
breach of an implied term in fact. Arguably he equated good 
faith to a factual event and hence avoided the issue of defining 
good faith a very good example of legal gymnastics. In essence 
he avoided a definitional issue by relegating it to a factual one.  
“This technique gives judges discretion to examine the issue on 
a case-to-case base.”87 However, Leggatt J. went on to argue 
that: 
                                                          
82 Walford v. Miles [1992] 2 AC 128 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
83 Walford, 2 AC at 138. 
84 Yam Seng Pty. Ltd. v. Int’l Trade Ltd. [2013] EWHC 111 (QB) (appeal 
taken from Eng.). 
85 Id. at ¶ 124. 
86 Yam Seng Pty. Ltd., [2013] EWHC at ¶ 131. 
87 Qi Zhou, The Yam Seng Case: A New Development of Good Faith in 
English Contract Law, XVII INT’L TRADE AND BUS. L. REV.358, 362 (2014). 
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A paradigm example of a general norm which underlies almost 
all contractual relationships is an expectation of honesty.  That 
expectation is essential to commerce, which depends critically on 
trust . . . [and]  the implication of an obligation of good faith is 
heavily dependent on the context.88 
Arguably therefore expectation of honesty was taken to ei-
ther replace the term of good faith or it was thought to be an 
interchangeable term. This is based on the courts observation 
that the respondent owed two implied duties namely an expec-
tation of honesty and observance of the standards of commer-
cial dealings.89  Furthermore as Leggatt J. treated the issue as 
a breach of an implied term in fact he noted that he can only do 
so if first the term implied is so obvious it goes without saying 
and secondly the term is necessary to give business efficacy to 
the contract.90 Of interest is that the judgment of Leggatt J 
generated extensive debate and has been noted in several cas-
es.91 
Considering that BP Reﬁnery used the same justification 
when implying terms as a matter of law as did Leggatt J who 
noted that good faith can only be implied as a matter of fact the 
question must be asked is there a difference between implied 
law and implied fact. Obviously comparing the two judgements 
there is none and it can be argued that Leggatt J merely tried 
to avoid creating a new precedent once the word good faith ap-
pears as a term in a contract. 
It follows that implied terms however they are phrased 
which includes good faith are treated in the same fashion. 
What remains to be determined is whether Burton’s theory not-
ing in brief that good faith is only applicable if a party’s discre-
tion is exercised to capture opportunities that were preserved 
upon entering the contract is different than the one noted in 
BP Reﬁnery and by Leggatt J. In Australia, White J in NSW 
                                                          
88 Yam Seng Pty. Ltd., [2013] EWHC at ¶¶ 135, 147. 
89 Zhou, supra note 87, at 364.  
90 Id. at 362. 
91 See Bristol Groundschool Limited v. Whittingham [2014] EWHC 2145 
(appeal taken from Eng.); Greenclose Ltd. v. National Westminster Bank plc 
[2014] EWHC 1156 (Ch) (appeal taken from Eng.); TSG Building Services plc 
v. S. Anglia Housing Ltd. [2013] EWHC 1151 (TCC) appeal taken from Eng.); 
Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust v. Compass Group UK and Ireland 
Ltd. (Trading As Medirest) [2013] EWCA Civ. 200 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
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Rifle Association Inc. v. Commonwealth gave a clear indication 
that good faith relies on the same principles as propounded in 
BP Reﬁnery. 
One fact is clear neither Australian jurisprudence nor Bur-
ton attempt to define what good faith means. Good faith is 
simply a mechanical tool to interpret contracts and give mean-
ing to the intention of the parties. BP Reﬁnery contemplated 
five conditions to justify the implication of a term. 
First “it must not contradict any express terms of the con-
tract.” Burton equally notes that only terms which allow a par-
ty discretion to perform is subject to a god faith interpretation. 
Secondly “it must be reasonable and equitable.” The counter-
part is the fact that Burton notes that the legitimate interests 
of both parties as determined at the formation of the contract 
will be enforced.  Thirdly “it must be necessary to give business 
efficacy to the contract so that no term will be implied if the 
contract is effective without it.”  Business efficacy is implied in 
Burton’s theory in the endeavour to objectively interpret terms 
in order to give force to the expectations of the parties. Fur-
thermore the fact that a term must be interpreted is the result 
that the contract otherwise would not be effective. Fourth it 
must be so obvious that “it goes without saying.” Burton does 
not expressly address this point however by noting that a term 
gives discretion to one party in their performance it can be ar-
gued that to give force to the term goes without saying. Lastly 
BP Reﬁnery notes that an implied term must be capable of 
clear expression. 
Arguably the term of good faith is not capable of clear ex-
pression as it is not able to be clearly and uniformly defined. 
However the term of good faith is recognised in Australia as 
precedent and has been implied into contracts and hence the 
function of good faith has a base despite not having been clear-
ly defined.  The point is that good faith is a functional principle 
and derives its purpose and application from a factual back-
ground and hence can be applied without having a clear defini-
tion. The Hon Marilyn Warren correctly noted that “in all our 
dealings, the commercial purpose test should be a fundamental 
consideration. On this, there is a clear mandate from the High 
Court. Respect for it will, in most cases, lead to the most ap-
propriate good faith outcome achievable in any particular 
23
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case.”92 
Comparing domestic and international legal documents 
containing the mandate of good faith the functional approach 
does pose problems.  The issue is that a functional approach 
requires an application of facts.  Considering that Australian 
sales law consists of common law and the CISG both containing 
a mandate to interpret contracts with good faith a difference in 
application is possible. This will happen even if the functional 
approach will be adopted by both of the sales law as they em-
ploy different tools to extract permissible facts which are in-
forming the court in their decision making. 
THE INTERPRETATIVE FRAMEWORK 
This part is by no means exhaustive and the purpose is to 
merely touch on the problem of interpretation and its effect on 
the application of good faith. The common law and the CISG 
employ different interpretative tools hence affecting the admis-
sible facts.93 It must be stated that the starting point of both 
systems is different. The common law adheres to the objective 
approach whereas the CISG in article 8(1) starts with the sub-
jective approach in the interpretation of contracts. 
In Common law the parol evidence rule is used but the is-
sue between the advocates of the textual approach and contex-
tual approach has not been completely resolved. Advocates of 
the textual approach to interpretation would suggest that good 
faith injects uncertainly into legal relationships and hence a 
very restrictive view is taken. According to this view it should 
be limited to a prohibition of intentional dishonesty only and 
not to modify explicit contractual terms or restrict powers at-
tributed by contract.94 The contextual approach on the other 
end of the spectrum attempts to guarantee the substantive jus-
tice of contractual relations (specifically in the U.S) by using 
good faith to incorporate equitable standards of fairness and 
decency into a contract which might depart from express con-
                                                          
92 Warren, supra note 47, at 357. 
93 See generally Bruno Zeller, The Parol Evidence Rule and the CISG – A 
Comparative Analysis, 36(3) COMP. INT’L L. J. S. AFR. 308 (2003). 
94 Sepe, supra note 8, at 3. 
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tractual provisions.95  The issue is whether under a good faith 
interpretative regime a court is obliged to abide by express 
terms and can only determine its own discretion when good 
faith is applied in relation to incompleteness in a contract and 
hence prevent opportunistic behaviour.  
In domestic Australian contracts in Western Export Ser-
vices Inc and Others v. Jireh International Pty. Ltd96 the High 
Court rejected a contextual interpretation and noted that: 
Acceptance of the applicant’s submission clearly would require 
reconsideration by this court of what was said in Codelfa Con-
struction Pty. Ltd. v. State Rail Authority (NSW) by Mason J, 
with the concurrence of Stephen and Wilson JJ, to be the “true 
rule” as to the admission of evidence of surrounding circumstanc-
es. Until this court embarks upon that exercise and disapproves 
or revises what was said in Codelfa, intermediate appellate 
courts are bound to follow that precedent. The same is true of 
primary judges, notwithstanding what may appear to have been 
said by intermediate appellate courts.97 
It is argued that following the rule as laid down by Codelfa98 a 
true understanding of good faith is impeded as only surround-
ing circumstance will in many cases reveal the intent of the 
parties and they are explicitly excluded. However recent devel-
opments have softened the approach to the interpretation of 
statutes and hence contractual texts in general. Kirby seems to 
agree with the contextual approach noting that: that “the in-
terpretation of contracts is concerned as such with discovering 
the subjective intentions of writers of the words in question.”99 
He went further arguing in Agricultural and Rural Finance 
Pty. Ltd. v. Gardiner and Another100  as the dissenting judge: “I 
would not accept this conclusion as stating an absolute rule. I 
do not agree that later communications and conduct of parties 
                                                          
95 Id. at 4. 
96 W. Export Servs. Inc. & Ors. v. Jireh Int’l Pty. Ltd. [2011] HCA 45 
(Austl.). 
97 Id. at ¶ 3.  
98 Codelfa Constr. Pty. Ltd. v. State Rail Authority [1982] (NSW) 149 
CLR 337 (Austl.). 
99 Michael  Kirby, Towards a Grand Theory of Interpretation: The Case 
of Statutes and Contracts, 24(2) STATUTE L. REV. 95, 98 (2003). 
100 Agric. & Rural Fin. Pty. Ltd. v. Gardiner & Ano. [2008] HCA 57 
(Austl.). 
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to an agreement are inadmissible when tendered to indicate 
acceptance by the parties of a particular meaning of the lan-
guage used in their agreement.”101 
Kirby J specifically argues in relation to the admissibility 
of post contractual conduct. However the question is why is 
pre-contractual conduct not included in his argument? After all 
the true beginning of a construction of words and their mean-
ing commences at the pre- contractual period, then progresses 
possibly to a written statement and is followed by post contrac-
tual conduct. 
Turning to the CISG article 8 provides rules for the inter-
pretation of an agreement based on the statements and the 
conduct of the parties. Both the subjective as well as objective 
intent may be relevant. Importantly article 8(1) set out the sub-
jective intent first. The key criterion is that both parties either 
knew or could not have been unaware what the intent was. On-
ly if the subjective intent does not yield any result will the 
court revert to the objective intent of the parties. The CISG 
prescribes the reasonable person test as well as the intent of 
the parties which is defined in article 8(3). Furthermore this 
article also notes what circumstances can be taken into consid-
eration when determining the intent of the parties or the rea-
sonable person. These include “the negotiations, any practices 
which the parties have established between themselves, usages 
and any subsequent conduct of the parties.”102 
It is argued that Burton – inadvertently perhaps – allowed 
pre-contractual conduct to be taken into consideration when 
determining the intent of the parties. Burton noted that good 
faith performance occurs when a party’s discretion is exercised 
for any purpose within the reasonable contemplation of the 
parties at the time of formation [of the contract].103 It goes 
without saying that the formation stage is heavily influenced 
what the parties know or ought to have known and hence pre-
contractual conduct ought to be taken into consideration in or-
der to fully appreciate Burton’s theory. The CISG has done that 
                                                          
101 Id. 
102 Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Jan. 1, 
1988, 149 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 8(3). 
103 Burton, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Law Code, supra note 
18, at 373.   
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in article 8. 
The contrary argument is that the written contract reflects 
the contemplation of the parties and hence the parol evidence 
rules specifically the contextual approach will enable the court 
to understand what was in the minds of the parties.  The prob-
lem is that the courts will not take the intentions of the parties 
in their pre-contractual discussions into consideration. The dif-
ference between the CISG and common law is best illustrated 
by a CISG case which was applied in the U.S. In MCC-Marble 
Ceramic Center v. Ceramica Nuova D’Agostino104 the issue was 
whether the parol evidence rule of domestic law applies to the 
interpretation of a contract governed by CISG. 
A U.S. retailer, the buyer, agreed orally with the seller, an Ital-
ian manufacturer of ceramic tiles, on the basic terms for the pur-
chase of tiles. The parties then recorded these terms in the sell-
er’s standard, pre-printed order form and the president of the 
buyer’s company signed the form on behalf of the company. The 
form was printed in the Italian language and contained terms on 
both the front and back. The buyer presented affidavits from its 
president and two employees of the seller stating that the parties 
did not intend to be bound by the standard terms on the order 
form.105 
Balancing the U.S. parol evidence rule against CISG Arti-
cle 8, the court stated: 
[A]rticle 8(3) of the CISG expressly directs courts to give ‘due 
consideration . . . to all relevant circumstances of the case includ-
ing the negotiations . . .” to determine the intent of the parties. 
Given article 8(1)’s directive to use the intent of the parties to in-
terpret their statements and conduct, article 8(3) is a clear in-
struction to admit and consider parol evidence regarding the ne-
gotiations to the extent they reveal the parties’ subjective 
intent. . . .106 
Of note is the fact that the District Court for the Sothern 
District of Florida excluded evidence on the basis of the domes-
tic parol evidence rule whereas the Federal Appellate Court 
correctly noted the homeward trend and reversed the judg-
                                                          
104 MCC-Marble Ceramic Center v. Ceramica Nuova D’Agostino, 144 
F.3d 1384 (11th Cir. 1998). 
105 Id.  
106 Id. 
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ment. 
CONCLUSION 
It has been argued that a definition of good faith is elusive. 
This paper argues that while this may be correct, it is not whol-
ly relevant, as theory and jurisprudence indicate that a defini-
tion is simply not needed. Both Burton and Summers have 
purposefully not attempted to define good faith. Burton specifi-
cally has changed the focus of attention away from an endeav-
our to find a definition of good faith to define a fact pattern 
where good faith is the principle of law. Both authors have 
demonstrated that good faith can only be applied if there is a 
factual pattern. Specifically Burton noted that good faith is re-
quired when a party’s discretion is exercised for any purpose 
which is not within the reasonable contemplation of the parties 
at the time of formation. This principle is needed to – repeating 
Summers words -  “do justice and do it according to law.”107 
The analysis of Australian jurisprudence as an example of 
a nation developing its relationship to good faith shows that it 
is possible to reach the same conclusion as Burton and Sum-
mers with the use of an implied duty of good faith but without 
a solid theoretical base. 
This paper has also highlighted that good faith outcomes 
are not necessarily identical even given the same factual pat-
terns as the interpretational tools vary between Australian 
domestic and international sales contracts as seen in MCC-
Marble. To that end Andersen may have been (mostly) correct 
in noting that good faith “is simply too tainted by regional di-
versity to be of any constructive use on a global transnational 
playing field.”108  However, the proviso applies that this is only 
so taking the interpretational tools into consideration and not 
the term of good faith. 
The Gordian knot of the concept of good faith remains un-
solvable at a transnational level as long as the interpretive 
tools applied are diverse. 
 
                                                          
107 Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law, supra note 17, at 
198. 
108 Andersen, supra note 5, at 311.  
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